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The structuration of organizational learning 
 
Abstract 
Although it is currently common to speak of organizational learning, this notion is 
still surrounded by conceptual confusion. It is unclear how notions like learning, 
knowledge and cognitive activities can be applied to organizations. Some authors 
have tried to unravel the conceptual and ontological problems by giving an account 
of the role of individuals in organizational learning. However, this has not yet led to 
an agreed upon analysis. In this article an attempt is made to develop a social 
account of organizational learning based upon structuration theory. This results in a 
comprehensive account of the relationship between individual and organizational 
learning and an analysis of organizational learning. This analysis needs not to be 
interpreted as a metaphor nor falls prey to the fallacies of reification and 
antropomorphization.  
 
Descriptors: organizational learning, organizational knowledge, individual 
learning, structuration theory.  
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Introduction 
The concept of organizational learning has been introduced in the field of 
organization studies in the early work of March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and 
March (1963). Cyert and March argued that organizations are not omnisciently 
rational and therefore unable to completely plan their course of action in advance. 
In stead, organizations have to adapt continuously to their environment. Cyert and 
March labeled this process organizational learning (Cyert and March 1963: 123). 
Since these early contributions, numerous authors have tried to illuminate the 
concept of organizational learning (for example Cangelosi and Dill 1965; Argyris 
and Schön 1978; Duncan and Weiss 1979; Hedberg 1981; Levitt and March 1988; 
Brown and Duguid 1991; Dodgson 1993; Fiol 1994; Cohen and Sproull 1996; 
Weick and Westley 1996). These and other authors elaborated upon and moved 
beyond these initial formulations in various ways. Inspiration has been drawn from 
a variety of perspectives, including psychology, management science, production 
management, organization theory, evolutionary economics and innovation 
management. Each of these perspectives has resulted in valuable insights in the 
conditions, dynamics or outcomes of organizational learning (Easterby-Smith 
1997). Most authors do not consider organizational learning as a unique feature of a 
special type of organization, particularly those that are called ‘learning 
organizations’ (Senge 1990). Organizational learning is a process that occurs in 
every organization (Easterby-Smith 1997). Despite of this presumed omnipresence 
of organizational learning, this notion is still surrounded by conceptual confusion.  
 
One central point of debate is how the concept of learning, often associated with 
knowledge, cognition, mental activities and consciousness, can be applied to  
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organizations. To some authors this necessarily implies committing the ontological 
fallacies of reification and antropomorphization, that is, considering organizations 
as independent entities and ascribing human-like qualities to them. Therefore it has 
been argued that organizational learning should be interpreted as a metaphor in 
order to avoid these fallacies (Argyris and Schön 1978; Dodgson 1993). Cook and 
Yanow (1993) and Weick and Westley (1996) propose another interpretation. 
According to them a cognitivist perspective on organizational learning either takes 
the organization as an independent cognitive entity, which can only be interpreted 
as a metaphor, or reduces organizational learning to individual learning in an 
organizational context. They propose that organizational learning should be 
interpreted in terms more appropriate to organizations such as changing an 
organizational culture. Both options, calling organizational learning a metaphor and 
abandoning the concepts of knowledge and cognition in favor of organizational 
culture, can be viewed as escape routes. Therefore many authors stick to a focus on 
cognition, but try to avoid the mentioned fallacies by offering an adequate account 
of the role of individuals in organizational learning. For this reason the relationship 
between individual learning and organizational learning has been discussed from 
early works on organization learning, such as those of Cangelosi and Dill (1965) 
and Argyris and Schön (1978) onwards to recent publications like Crossan et al. 
(1999). However, these latter authors conclude in a summary of some major 
statements that none of them has satisfactorily dealt with the different levels that 
play a role in organizational learning. And Nicolini and Meznar (1995: 730) stated 
that the relationship between individual learning and organizational learning is far 
from clear and that more work, both empirically and theoretically, is necessary. 
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Our contribution is intended to be as follows. We want to present a comprehensive 
analysis of the relationship between individuals and organizational learning. Some 
previous accounts of this relationship will be discussed and shown to have 
limitations. Our own social account of organizational learning will draw upon 
structuration theory as developed by Giddens. In addition to that, we want to defend 
the claim that organizations can learn, without having to take recourse to calling it a 
metaphor or committing the fallacies of reification and antropomorphization. As 
part of the analysis an alternative interpretation of the concept of organizational 
knowledge will be given. 
 
This article will continue with a discussion of the problematic of the relationship 
between individual and organizational learning and some of the answers that have 
been proposed. After that, structuration theory will be introduced. Drawing upon 
structuration theory and some basic ideas on learning, we will give an initial 
account of organizational knowledge and organizational learning. After this initial 
description of organizational learning has been given, a structurationist account of 
organizational learning will be developed further. We will conclude with a 
discussion of the merits of our analysis and some suggestions for further research.  
 
Individuals and organizational learning 
The relationship between individual learning and organizational learning has been 
extensively discussed within the literature on organizational learning. The central 
problem has often been posed as follows. To most authors it seems obvious that 
individuals play an important role in organizational learning. Individuals are seen as 
the agents or instruments of learning (Cyert and March 1963; Argyris and Schön  
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1978; Hedberg 1981; Shrivastava 1983). Simon (1991: 125) states that ‘all learning 
takes place inside individual human heads’. On the other hand authors tend to agree 
that organizational learning is more than a simple aggregation of individual 
learning (Duncan and Weiss 1979; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Crossan et al. 1999). 
Argyris and Schön (1978) consider individual learning as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for organizational learning. Organizational learning cannot be 
reduced to individual learning. Several answers to the question of how 
organizational learning relates to individual learning have been given in the 
literature. A representative, but surely not complete, overview of these answers is 
presented in Table 1. Suggestions include that organizational learning is the 
learning of some key individuals, that individual learning products need to be 
shared in order for the organization to have learned, that individual learning should 
be incorporated or institutionalized in organizational memory or other 
organizational features and that the collective component of organizational learning 
lies in the working out of controversies. Some authors suggest that one or more 
extra conditions have to be fulfilled for individual learning to turn into 
organizational learning. Others suggest that organizational learning should not be 
conceived as individual learning plus something extra. Some of these ideas might 
be complementary, others contradict each other. We believe that each of the 
mentioned authors has made valuable remarks on the differences and connections 
between organizational and individual learning, but none of them has sketched a 
comprehensive picture of it. 
 
- Insert Table 1 around here -  
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In our opinion, one of the reasons for the lack of a comprehensive account of the 
relationship between individual learning and organizational learning, is the absence 
of a genuine social theory. Organizational learning is a social phenomenon, as is 
indicated by the characteristics mentioned in table 1. However, most inspiration in 
the theory of organizational learning seems to be derived from theories of 
individual learning. Several authors, for example Dodgson (1993), would like to 
connect organization theory and psychology, in order to apply concepts developed 
for individuals to organizations as well as to discuss the learning of individuals in 
an organizational context. However, the former use of theories of individual 
learning seems to be misguided and the latter use incomplete. Theories of 
individual learning are relevant, for individuals play a role in organizational 
learning, but they are unable to capture the social nature of organizational learning. 
In this article a more comprehensive account of the social nature of organizational 
learning is developed, based on Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens 1976; 1979; 
1984). There are four reasons why structuration theory looks a particularly useful 
starting point when discussing the relationship between individual and 
organizational learning. In the first place, the relationship between individual and 
collective phenomena is at the heart of structuration theory. Second, Giddens puts 
the knowledgeability of actors on the frontstage of his theory. This makes his 
theory useful for the analysis of knowledge and learning in organizations. Third, 
Giddens’ analysis of structure provides a starting point for the description of the 
interplay of different structural elements. The fourth reason is that the structuration 
theory sketches a dynamic picture of social reality that suits well to the dynamic 
nature of the phenomenon under study.  
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Structuration theory 
Structuration theory (Giddens 1976; 1979; 1984) is an ontology of social reality 
that attempts to overcome dualisms that have become deeply entrenched within 
social theory: subjectivism versus objectivism, individual versus society and social 
atomism versus holism. Over the last years structuration theory has received 
increasing attention within the field of organization studies (see for example the 
recent special issue of Organization Studies on the agency-structure debate 
(Bouchikhi et al. 1997)). Structuration theory reconceptualizes the dualism of 
individual versus society as the duality of agency and structure. Agency and 
structure, the subjective and objective sides of social reality, are considered to be 
inseparable. To develop this thesis, Giddens had to rework both the concept of 
social structure and that of the acting individual.  
 
Social structure has often been seen as a stable, constraining phenomenon, like the 
skeleton within a body or the walls of a building. Giddens sketches a dynamic 
picture of structure, as both outcome and resource for action, both constraining and 
enabling. According to structuration theory, structure consists of rules and 
resources. Giddens distinguishes two types of rules: interpretative and normative. 
Interpretative rules govern the way actors interpret the world in which they live. 
They constitute the cognitive aspect of social structure. Normative rules regulate 
the legitimization of actions. Resources fall apart into authoritative resources 
(power relationships) and economic resources. This interpretation of structure is 
different from and broader than the way structure is commonly used in organization 
theory. For example, it encompasses what is generally taken to be organizational 
culture. One of the main concepts of structuration theory is the ‘duality of  
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structure’. This means that social structures are both the outcome and the very 
medium of social interaction (Giddens 1976: 121). Structures are an outcome in the 
sense that they are produced and reproduced in interaction. Structure is a resource 
for interaction in the sense that actors do not construct social reality from scratch, 
but draw upon each of the pre-existing structural elements in their actions. The 
existing rules and resources make human actions possible. On the other hand, 
however, human action is also constrained by existing structures. This implies that 
structure is both enabling and constraining. In order to draw upon pre-existing rules 
and resources, and therewith reproduce them, actors have to be ‘knowledgeable’ of 
them. ‘Knowledgeability’ refers to the knowledge individuals have of the 
circumstances of their actions and the rules they follow. Some of this knowledge is 
propositional in character, but most of it is carried in what Giddens calls practical 
consciousness. This is comparable to Polanyi’s (1958) concept of tacit knowing.  
 
In addition to a redefinition of social structure, structuration theory implies that the 
notion of agency, of the individual acting person, has to be reworked too. The 
individual is not a rock-bottom given, as those who want to reduce society to 
individuals assume. Individuals necessarily draw upon pre-existing rules and 
resources. This entails a ‘decentring of the subject’. It does not imply that actors are 
slaves of existing structures. They have the power to ‘act otherwise’, the possibility 
to say ‘no’ (Giddens 1984: 12). This implies that the means whereby systems are 
reproduced, the interactions of knowledgeable actors, contain within them the seeds 
of change. However, ascribing knowledgeability to actors, does not imply that they 
are omniscient about their motives, conditions and consequences of their actions. 
Giddens speaks of ‘unacknowledged preconditions’ and ‘unintended consequences  
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of action’ which form the bounds of knowledgeability (idem: 294). Both play an 
important role in the production and reproduction of structure. This construction 
and reconstruction of structure by the interaction of knowledgeable actors is called 
‘structuration’. 
 
Structures are properties of social systems, or, more adequately, social systems 
have structural properties. A social system exists of the reproduced relations 
between actors or collectivities, organized as regular social practices. According to 
structuration theory, social systems are not less real than individuals. The one is not 
less fundamental than the other is. Social systems do have properties that cannot be 
described in terms of concepts referring to the consciousness of actors. But 
structures cannot be characterized independently of actors’ meanings. Social 
systems do not have an independent existence.  
 
Giddens also addresses the question how we should interpret our talking about an 
organization’s actions. We speak of an organization firing one of its employees, 
selling products and taking over another organization. Does this mean that 
organizations have agency, that is, the possibility to causally intervene in the 
world? When we zoom in, we will find people filling out forms, packaging 
products, signing contracts, etcetera. According to structuration theory, 
organizations are nothing more than the regularized practices of individuals. 
Organizations differ from other social systems in the degree in which there is an 
emphasis on the reflexive regulation of system reproduction. The individual actors 
are the agents of these practices; they are the ones who are able to make a 
difference. Organizations therefore do not have agency (Giddens 1984: 220). The  
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apparent ability of organizations to act consists of the agency of its constituent 
members. Therefore, for example, the statement ‘the government has decided …’ is 
shorthand for a statement about actions of individuals. Sometimes the shorthand 
statement can be useful. But when we want to look inside an organization, we will 
have to find out how individual practices contribute to what can be described as 
organizational action.  
It is important to understand that ‘The government decided …’ or ‘The 
government acted …’ are shorthand statements because in some situations it 
may matter a great deal which individuals were the main initiators or 
executors of whatever decisions were taken (or not taken) and whatever 
policies followed (Giddens 1984: 221). 
Whenever we say that organizations experiment, experience, reflect, reason or 
perform other activities associated with organizational learning, we implicitly refer 
to practices carried out by individuals within an organizational context.  
 
A definition of organizational learning  
In order to arrive at a definition of organizational learning, we deem it necessary to 
specify a general notion of learning. In the behaviorist tradition learning is seen as 
the process leading to changes in behavior, or in potential behavior, based on 
experience. Some authors within the literature on organizational learning follow 
this conceptualization. The idea of an organization adapting to its environment does 
clearly fit within this perspective too. Others consider the development of 
knowledge, or a more or less synonymous term, as the defining characteristic of 
learning (Duncan and Weiss 1979; Shrivastava 1983; Nicolini and Meznar 1995). 
This knowledge may either be explicit or tacit (Polanyi 1958; Nonaka 1994). A  
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third approach to the definition of learning couples both aspects. It agrees with the 
idea that learning implies a change in the range of (potential) behaviors, but only so 
far as this change is brought about by a change in knowledge (Shrivastava 1983; 
Huber 1991; Dodgson 1993; Crossan et al. 1999). This is in accordance with recent 
psychological definitions of learning (Anderson 1995; Bower and Hilgard 1981). 
Bower and Hilgard for example state that we should not speak of learning when an 
entity’s potential behavior has changed because of  growth or increase of strength. 
In this article we will follow this line and define learning as the process of changing 
the range of an entity’s (potential) behavior based on the development of its 
knowledge.  
 
Applying this definition of learning to organizations would result in describing 
organizational learning as the process leading to changes in potential organizational 
actions based on the development of the knowledge of an organization. How should 
this description be interpreted? Answering this question requires an account of 
changes in organizational behavior and in the knowledge underlying these changes. 
According to structuration theory an organization consists of regularized practices. 
Speaking of organizational actions implicitly refers to these practices. This implies 
that a change in an organization’s potential behavior consists of a change in the 
possible practices executed by knowledgeable individuals. In what way can the 
development of knowledge underlie such a change in practices? The knowledge 
that is used in organizational actions, which might reasonably be called 
organizational knowledge, is necessarily carried by individuals executing those 
practices. Thus the development of knowledge which ought to underlie changes in 
order for learning to have occurred, can only be a development of knowledge  
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possessed by individuals. This does not mean that all individual knowledge is 
organizational knowledge, for by far not all knowledge that an individual possesses, 
or assumes to possess, can be used in organizational practices. Organizational 
learning can now be defined a little more precisely as the process leading to 
changes in possible organizational practices, based on the development of 
knowledge of the actors executing those practices. 
 
Two points have to be clarified about the above account of organizational 
knowledge and organizational learning. In the first place it might be objected that 
this account implies that organizational knowledge could be held by one member, 
which contradicts the tendency in the literature to reserve this term for knowledge 
shared within an organization. However, in most organizations, especially the 
larger ones, only a part of the knowledge will be shared by all members. 
Organizational knowledge is distributed in character (Hutchins 1995; Tsoukas 
1996). Members of an organization execute different tasks and will develop their 
knowledge in relation to their tasks. Due to the situated and tacit nature of part of 
this knowledge, it is impossible to give an overall representation of the distributed 
knowledge and it will be unlikely that there is one person in who all knowledge 
comes together (Tsoukas 1996). To place the conceptual demand that 
organizational knowledge needs to be shared seems to be unworkable (which does 
not deny that often knowledge needs to be shared in order for an organization to 
function effectively (see for example Weick and Roberts 1993)).    
 
In the second place, it is sometimes suggested that organizational knowledge is 
embedded in routines, or sets of connected routines. If this means that routines are  
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themselves considered to be knowledge, the suggestion seems to be misguided. 
Apart from logical behaviorism (Ryle 1949) not many people have considered it 
adequate to equate behavior and knowledge. If it means that routines are the carrier 
of knowledge, we face another problem. The execution of a routine can be 
associated with two types of knowledge. First, the organization members executing 
the routine need to know how to do so. In this sense routines are based on 
procedural memory (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994). The second type of knowledge 
concerns the knowledge why the routine is executed, knowing to what results it 
leads. Cohen and Bacdayan (1994: 555) refer to the Soviet troops who arrived 
secretly in Cuba but nonetheless formed into ranks on the dock and marched 
conspicuously away. The fact that a routine is executed does not imply that it is 
effective. It makes a difference whether one or more organization members know 
that the routine leads to certain effects or not, and whether the organization acts on 
this knowledge. Some might suggest that an organization may ‘have its reasons of 
which its members know little’, but we consider that idea untenable (Giddens 
1984). Therefore it is not useful to identify organizational knowledge and routines. 
We stick to the idea that organizational knowledge is knowledge that can be used in 
routines and other types of practices.  
 
Structuration theory and organizational learning 
In the previous section organizational learning has been defined as the process 
leading to a change in possible organizational practices, based on the development 
of knowledge of the actors executing those practices. In this paragraph we want to 
elaborate upon this definition from a structuration theoretic point of view. We want 
to address the question when new knowledge can be applied in organizational  
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practices. Before we turn to that question we will first discuss the knowledge 
development process itself.  
 
Within the literature on organizational learning one can often find the idea that 
knowledge development is an individual affair. After knowledge has been 
developed by individuals, it is assumed that something has to be added to turn it 
into organizational learning. In some cases learning activities will be executed by 
an individual. But even in those cases people draw upon existing rules and 
resources. In order to learn, people necessarily make use of existing interpretative 
rules, and need the resources and legitimation to address the questions they are 
interested in. Individual learning is always embedded within a social structure. 
However, knowledge development has often an even more fully social character. 
Knowledge development can consist of a large number of more or less cognitive 
activities, which can comprise, amongst others, observation, imitation, coming up 
with hypotheses, induction, deduction, designing experiments, executing 
experiments, interpreting results and evaluating knowledge claims. Sets of those 
activities will often be executed by more than one person. When these activities are 
executed by more than one person, the knowledge development process will 
comprise interactions too. These interactions might include processes of consensus 
formation, argumentation, negotiation, persuasion and knowledge sharing. In these 
interactions the validity of knowledge claims is at stake. Whether an idea, 
hypothesis or theory is accepted as  knowledge can be heavily dependent upon 
others. In our opinion this is true whether one defines knowledge in terms of 
collective acceptance, like sociologists of knowledge do (Bloor 1976) or accepts a 
traditional epistemological definition like ‘justified true belief’ (Audi 1998). The  
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interactions that can be part of the knowledge development process take place 
within the existing organizational structure. People draw upon existing rules and 
resources, to which they might have access in differing degrees. This means in the 
first that actors draw upon existing knowledge in the development of new 
knowledge. But the cognitive aspect is only one side of the coin. It is acknowledged 
by certain writers on organizational learning that social circumstances, comprising 
power, economic resources, and organizational norms can influence the content of 
what gets learned (Boje 1994; Easterby-Smith 1997; Brown and Duguid 1991; 
Argyris and Schön 1978; Lazega 1992). Interesting parallels can be drawn with 
sociological studies of science and technology (see for example Hagendijk 1990). 
Researchers within that field have focussed on scientific controversies (Collins and 
Pinch 1993) and local interactions between scientists (Latour and Woolgar 1979; 
Knorr-Cetina 1981). Their studies of scientific developments have shown how 
scientific theories emerge from social interactions, in which reason and reality do 
not speak with one voice. These interactions are for example influenced by power 
relations, interests, networks, differing paradigms and available resources.  
 
According to our definition, organizational learning requires that knowledge can be 
used within organizational practices. Knowledge becomes organizational 
knowledge when the practices in which it can be applied become part of the 
regularized and reflexively monitored practices that make up the organization. The 
use of new knowledge within the practices of an individual, requires that these new 
practices should be enabled by all dimensions of the existing structure. In the first 
place, the application of new knowledge can be enabled or constrained by the 
existing interpretative rules that form the cognitive aspect of an organization. In  
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other words, new knowledge should to some degree be in accordance with other 
knowledge within the organization. Even in the cases in which knowledge 
development has a more individual character, it should be possible to integrate this 
knowledge with the knowledge of others within the organization. In other cases this 
will require a more social knowledge development process, as outlined above. 
Second, the application of new knowledge can be enabled and constrained by 
existing authoritative or power relations. To change working practices, one needs to 
have the authority to do so. This explains the reason why some authors speak of 
organizational learning as the learning of key individuals, like top management. For 
they are the ones who are most able to apply this knowledge in their practices and 
order others to change working practices. However, no one oversees all knowledge 
that is used and everyone has some power over how he or she executes his or her 
work. This means that individuals have to some degree the possibility to apply new 
knowledge in their organizational practices and thereby transforming their learning 
into organizational learning. When he or she does not have this power it is 
necessary to convince others who do have it. Third, the distribution of economic 
resources can enable or constrain the use of new knowledge. The application of 
knowledge most often needs material and financial resources. One might, for 
example, have an idea for a new product, but lack the resources to develop this 
product. Here we see that resources can be both enabling and constraining in the 
process of organization learning. Therefore the economic power, the access to 
goods and money, needs careful attention in the analysis of organization learning. 
In the last place, the application of new knowledge can be enabled or constrained 
by existing normative rules. Normative rules can be seen as the basis for the 
specification of rights and obligations in specific situations. From organization  
  18 
members it is expected that they perform certain tasks, follow certain procedures 
and meet certain output standards. Standard operating procedures are a clear 
example of strong normative rules. Normative rules can be enabling in providing 
the legitimation to change working practices on the basis of new knowledge and be 
constraining in prohibiting such changes. The constraining effect of normative 
rules, which can of course be more ore less severe, is what March and Olsen (1979: 
57) have called ‘role constrained learning’.  
 
The development and application of knowledge will be enabled and constrained by 
existing interpretative and normative rules and economic and authoritative 
resources. But, of course, organizations differ in their structural characteristics. This 
suggests that the way the process of organizational learning is structured differs 
from organization to organization. One dimension on which the organization of 
organizational learning might differ is the amount of organizational members 
involved. Compare for example a manager individualistically interpreting the 
environment and acting upon his interpretation, with highly participative 
interpretation processes. Shrivastava (1983) has distinguished between types of 
organizational learning systems partly based on differences along this dimension. 
The organization of organizational knowledge production might also vary over 
time. In a study of the NASA, Vaughan (1999) has shown how the pressure on 
reaching consensus varied over the course of a project. These and other structural 
differences might characterize and influence both the process and the content of 
organizational learning. Such differences in the organization of organizational 
learning require more attention then they have received until now. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
Our main objective in this article has been to deliver a contribution to an unsolved 
conceptual problem regarding organizational learning: the relationship between 
individual and organizational learning. In this final section, we want to answer the 
question whether our analysis meets the requirements set out in the beginning of 
this article. We have used Giddens’ structuration theory to overcome the dualism of 
organization and individual in the study of organizational learning. Organizational 
learning was defined as the process leading to changes in possible organizational 
practices, based on the development of the knowledge of the actors executing those 
practices. Organization learning requires that this new knowledge can be applied 
within organizational practices. Both the development of knowledge and the 
possible application of new knowledge have important collective dimensions. 
Organizational learning arises from the actions and interactions of individuals, 
which are enabled and constrained by the existing structural properties of an 
organization. This implies that organizational learning cannot be reduced to 
individual learning, individual learning within an organizational context, or 
individual learning plus something extra such as the sharing of knowledge. Nor is 
organizational learning a process completely distinct from individual actions and 
individual learning. According to us, organizational learning can best be viewed as 
a process of structuration. We believe that this conceptualization of organizational 
learning integrates both the individual contributions and its organizational character 
in a well-balanced manner. 
 
In our approach we do not interpret organizational learning as a metaphor. 
Organizations do learn. That does not mean however, that we step into the pitfall of  
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reification and antropomorphization. Reification can be thought of as the 
apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things in non-human or 
superhuman terms (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 89). In our account of 
organizational learning, however, the constituting roles of human agents are 
essential. We have avoided antropomorphization by limiting the analogies with 
human learning. To assume that organizations go through the same processes of 
learning as do human beings seems unnecessarily naïve (Cyert and March 
1963:123). The apparent likeness in the learning activities of human beings and 
organizations does not imply that the underlying processes are necessarily alike, as 
we hope to have shown.  
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Argyris and Schön (1978)  the results of individual learning have to be embodied 
in organizational memory in order to speak of 
organizational learning 
Duncan  and  Weiss  (1979)  an organization has learned if new communicable, 
consensual and integrated knowledge, relevant to 
organizational activities, has come available to 
organizational decision makers  
Hedberg (1981)  an organization has learned if the results of individual 
learning have been incorporated in organizational 
memory (for example standard operating procedures) 
and have therewith become independent of any 
individual 
Shrivastava  (1983)  an organization has learned if a an organizational 
member shares newly acquired knowledge, beliefs and 
assumptions with others  
Huber  (1991)  an organization learns if any of its units acquires 
knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to 
the organization 
Lyles  and  Schwenk  (1992)  organizational learning involves communicating and 
integrating alternative schema’s by processes of 
bargaining, consensus and dissensus 
Kim  (1993)  what an individual has learned needs to become 
embedded in an organization’s memory and structure; 
this requires an exchange of individual and shared 
mental models 
Dodgson (1993)  organizational learning is the learning of the dominant 
coalition 
Boje  (1994)  the collective learning task is to work out the 
controversies between various sides of a story 
Nonaka  (1994)    what an individual has learned needs to be 
organizationally  amplified, crystallized, transformed, 
legitimized and justified 
Crossan et al. (1999)  what an individual has learned, in interaction, needs to 
be institutionalized and embedded in systems, 
structures, strategy, routines and prescribed practices 
of the organization 
 
Table 1: perspectives on the relationship between individual learning and 
organizational learning  
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